O VER the past several decades, genome sequencing technologies have evolved from slow and expensive systems that were limited in access to a select few scientists and forensics investigators to high-throughput, relatively low-cost tools that are available to consumers. A direct consequence of such rapid technical progress is that genomics is becoming one of the next major challenges for privacy and security [1] because (i) a volunteer, accepting to have his genomic code made public, can leak substantial information about their ethnic heritage, as well as the genomic data of their relatives [2] , [3] , (ii) genetically-influenced diseases can be unveiled [4] , (iii) the propensity to develop specific diseases (such as Alzheimer's) can be revealed [5] , and (iv) complex privacy issues can arise if DNA analysis is used for criminal investigations and insurance purposes [6] .
As genomics is increasingly integrated into healthcare [7] and direct-to-consumer recreational services [8] (e.g., ancestry testing), the risk of genomic data leakage has grown for both individuals and their relatives. Failure to adequately protect such information could lead to societal and regulatory backlashes, which could impede genomic research and society more generally. At the same time, there are questions about the magnitude of such risks. This prompts the need for research and innovation in all aspects of genome privacy and security.
To foster research in understanding and addressing privacy and security issues in genomics, we organized the 3rd International Workshop on Genome Privacy and Security (GenoPri) in 2016. This workshop aimed to bring together a highly interdisciplinary community involved in all aspects of genome privacy and security research. This workshop built on its two predecessors, GenoPri'14, and GenoPri'15, which were collocated with the Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) and IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, respectively.
GenoPri'16 aimed to expand its reach to the medical community. To accomplish this goal, GenoPri'16 was collocated with the American Medical Informatics Association Annual Fall Symposium (AMIA), a premier medical informatics venue. The number of participants during the day exceeded 60 and the workshop included technical sessions (featuring peer-reviewed papers), two panels, a tutorial, and two invited talks. The themes of the technical sessions were (i) privacy-preserving personalized medicine, (ii) privacy-preserving research, and (iii) risks and quantification of privacy. The panels focused on 1) future research directions in genomics privacy and security and 2) existing and future ethical principles, policies, and legislation. The two invited talks were delivered by Dr. Shawn Murphy of the Harvard Medical School, who discussed the balance between genomic data privacy and utility in the context of clinical research informatics systems and Dr. Christian Lovis of the University Hospitals of Geneva, who discussed truth in the era of big data, genomics, and the practice of medicine.
The three papers selected to appear in this special section of the IEEE/ACM Transactions on Computational Biology and Bioinformatics were drawn from the set of accepted peerreviewed technical papers. The papers that were accepted cover prominent perspectives of genomic privacy, including privacy measurement, exploratory research respecting privacy and security, and secure genomic analytics. We have ordered the papers to illustrate the progression of privacy and security with respect to genomic data.
The first paper in this special section focuses on the issue of privacy from the perspective of inference from genomic records. Specifically, this paper from Saarland University (Germany), focuses on genomic privacy in the context of populations over time. The authors introduce a simulationbased approach for quantifying the impact of continuously sequencing and publicizing personal genomic data on a population's genomic privacy. They account for the influence of geopolitical events, such as migration, as well as sociological trends, such as interracial mating. The authors notably report that that an increasing sharing rate of genomic data in the future entails a substantial negative effect on the privacy of all older generations.
While the first paper sets the stage for how information can be gleaned from genomic records, the second paper considers how to compute over such data without disclosing the exact contents of any particular record. Specifically, this paper "Protecting Privacy and Security of Genomic Data in i2b2 with Homomorphic Encryption and Differential Privacy" by Jean Louis Raisaro, Gwangbae Choi, Sylvain Pradervand, Raphael Colsenet, Nathalie Jacquemont, Nicolas Rosat, Vincent Mooser, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux from Ecole Polytechnique F ed erale de Lausanne (EPFL) and Lausanne University Hospital (Switzerland) and focuses on privacy-preserving cohort discovery and exploration. In this problem, the goal is to enable biomedical scientists to use data derived from electronic medical records, to detect groups of patients who meet specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. The authors report on the design of an efficient privacy-preserving explorer for genetic cohorts, as well as the deployment and evaluation of the system in a real operational setting. The solution is built on top of the popular i2b2 (Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside) software suite relies upon homomorphic encryption for secure data processing. The authors illustrate how their system supports exploration of 3,000 genetic variants over a cohort of 5,000 individuals in less than 5 seconds using commodity hardware. The last paper in this section moves beyond exploratory data investigations to consider how to prevent privacy leaks in the context of statistical computing. This paper from a team at the company Cybernetica AS (Estonia) specifically considers privacy leaks that can transpire in the context of computation for population stratification. In this work, the authors utilize matrix decomposition, in the form of principal components analysis, to reduce the dimensionality of a privacy-preserving setting through cryptographically secure multi-party computation. This is an important advancement because this type of matrix analysis is common in genome-based computations, such as modeling ancestral heritage in populations. In doing so, present a software implementation, as well as experimental results showing the performance of the approach.
We are highly encouraged by the increased participation and witnessed the growing of an interdisciplinary research community. The joint meeting with AMIA has been fruitful and many participants benefited from the cross-fertilization from each other. We are planning to continue the momentum in 2017 to work closely with the biomedical informatics community and push the fronts of genomic privacy technology to address the real world challenges. Thus, GenoPri'17 will be collocated with GA4GH Security Working Group (SWG) and American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) Annual Meeting. 
